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 Tyler Clementi, a freshman at Rutgers University in New York, committed suicide on 
September 22, 2010 by jumping from the George Washington Bridge which connects 
Manhattan and New Jersey. Clementi had recently discovered that his roommate was secretly 
taping his sexual encounters with other men and had ridiculed Clementi for these encounters 
and his sexual orientation on the internet. After Clementi’s highly publicized death, Dan 
Savage started the It Gets Better Project, creating videos “to inspire hope for young people 
facing harassment.”  Savage and his partner “In response to a number of students taking their 
own lives after being bullied in school, wanted to create a personal way for supporters 
everywhere to tell LGBT youth that, yes, it does indeed get better.”1 The fragile psyche of a male 
youth doubting his sexual orientation necessitates a strong, easily accessible gay role model. 
But recent decisions of the Supreme Court have obliterated many of the avenues with which 
these role models can effectively change the trajectories of struggling teens. Resultantly, the 
cultural discursion about sexual norms remains stagnant, imperiling the lives and mental 
health of sexually confused youth. Moreover, the instillation of homophobia or anti-gay 
rhetoric in impressionable youth by centers of norm formation contributes to repressive 
attitudes within society that exacerbate the nexus between lack of understanding and hatred.  
                                                     
1“It Gets Better” Project <http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project/> 
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The New Yorker published the above political cartoon2 in response to The Supreme 
Court’s 5-4 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council, et al., Petitioners 
v. James Dale (hereafter referred to as Dale), holding that New Jersey’s anti-discrimination in 
places of public accommodation statute could not force the Boy Scouts of America to continue 
employing openly-gay scoutmaster James Dale.3 With Dale, the Court endorsed the right for 
private groups to invidiously discriminate against certain classes of persons in the composition 
of their membership. With respect to the Boy Scouts of America, this conclusion is particularly 
problematic because it permits the Boy Scouts of America, an organization with the purpose of 
educating young males, to publicly impart the message that homosexuals are inferior. Not only 
does this instill homophobia as a value in impressionable persons, but it communicates that 
there is something inherently wrong with being gay that renders homosexuals incapable of 
being suitable role models; therefore, the youth struggling with their sexuality may become 
isolated and depressed, resulting in internalized self-hatred wholly detrimental to positive 
social development. In “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists,” Koppel? A name? opines 
that the Boy Scouts of America has the capability to “address the needs and vulnerabilities of 
[gay teenagers] without holding that homosexual conduct is morally licit” to ensure that these 
teens are not pressured to “hide” or are conditioned to believe that “their secret makes them 
intrinsically worthless,” a sentiment that “is more intense the more they already value and 
trust the adults who…ostracize gay people.”4 The Boy Scouts’ discriminatory policy proves 
problematic  for both the Scoutmasters and impressionable, young Scouts in the midst of the 
socialization process. 
Ergo, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Dale to 
exhume and illuminate its logical fallacies. Concurrently, in lieu of strengthening the grasp of 
homophobia, a reversal of the Court’s decision would progress the movement toward equality 
                                                     
2 Stevens, Mick. “And This One’s for Homophobia…” The New Yorker. January 2001. 
3 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 640 (2000) 
4 Koppelman, Andrew. “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?” Public Affairs Quarterly. October 2004. Pg. 375. 
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for all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Part I of this paper analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
Inc., et al.5, a 1994 case providing the precedent at the heart of the Dale decision. Part II 
regards the question of whether Hurley is an appropriate precedent for Dale, discussing the 
discrepancies between the facts of the cases. Part III deconstructs the majority and minority 
opinions in Dale. Part IV  discusses the methods adopted in an attempt to remedy the 
repercussions of the Court’s solidification of a First Amendment-approved right to discriminate 
through Dale and Hurley. 
Ia. The Hurley Story 
 The city of Boston, Massachusetts declared in 1938 that March 17 would be known as 
“Evacuation Day” to commemorate the historic event in 1776 wherein British troops and 
loyalists were removed from the city, culminating in the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day 
Parade. In 1947, the Parade’s “formal sponsorship by the city” concluded, and the 
organizational duties transferred to the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council. Every year 
since 1947, the Council has applied and received the permit to conduct the parade. Typically, 
at least 20,000 marchers participate in the parade in front of a crowd of over one million 
spectators.  Each year, the Council uses Boston’s official seal, receives direct funding from the 
city, and is provided printing services by the city for the purposes of conducting the parade.  
In 1992, GLIB, the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 
applied to march as a group in the parade. After the Council denied their request, GLIB 
obtained a court order to participate, marching “uneventfully” amidst the participants. When 
in 1993 GLIB applied  to march and were rejected by the Council again, the GLIB filed a suit, 
alleging violation of Massachusetts State and Federal Constitutions and of Massachusetts’s 
Public Accommodations Law, against the Council, Boston, and individual petitioner John J. 
                                                     
5 Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., et al. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  
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“Wacko” Hurley.  
The Massachusetts Public Accommodations Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation “relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of 
public accommodation, resort, or amusement.” GLIB averred that their exclusion from the 
parade, as a place of public accommodation, was invidious, especially in light of the Council’s 
history of particularly lenient standards for inclusion. In Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., et al., the Supreme Court voted unanimously to 
reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts; their finding was that 
Massachusetts’s public accommodation law was erroneously applied to “require private 
citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message 
that the organizers do not wish to convey,” in violation of the First Amendment.6  
The Court’s argument is divided into four sections. The first section involves a 
systematic deconstruction of the lower courts’ decisions on the case, with the Court conducting 
an independent examination of the record. Resultantly, the Court decried the lower court’s 
judgment as intrusive on the Council’s free speech rights; GLIB’s activity is not within the 
bounds of non-expressive conduct. The second section discusses the expressive nature of a 
parade, resolving that parades are expressive conduct – a “symbolic act” that necessitates 
protection under the First Amendment. The Council, through discretionary selection of parade 
participants, conveys a “collective point”7 to both marchers and spectators concerning 
Council’s expressed message. Ergo, the forced inclusion of an expressive group with a purpose 
in conflict with that of the Council unfairly interlopes in the Council’s expressive ability. The 
third section discusses the Massachusetts’ public accommodations law, upholding its 
constitutionality. As anti-discrimination laws operate to regulate categories of action and not 
content of speech, they are facially neutral and constitutional with regard to the 14th or 1st 
                                                     
6 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 
7 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 558 (1995) 
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amendments. The last prong of the Court’s argument delineates the scope of the public 
accommodations statute with regard to the inherent expressive quality of a parade, acquiescing 
that the Council has two distinct rights: the right to speak, and the right to be silent. 
Accordingly, the Council has the right to expound their message through the parade and to 
protect their message from alteration resulting from the mandates of an intrusive public 
accommodations law. Within the auspices of this case, the Council is free to refuse GLIB’s 
request for inclusion without fear of repercussive retaliation by the state.  
Ib. Hurley: Parade as Public Forum 
 Almost the entire argument posited by the Court in subsequent sections of the Opinion 
is proffered at the conclusion of the first; the Court ends its summary of the lower court 
decisions with Justice Nolan’s dissent from the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion. Nolan’s dissent maintains three central prongs: 1) that even if the Parade has no 
explicit message, GLIB’s message cannot be “forced upon it;” 2) that Parades are inherently 
expressive and protected speech such that a State, when attempting to eliminate discrimination 
through policy, must employ “narrowly drawn means” to achieve their goal to minimize the 
possible suppression of expressive content; and 3) that exclusion based on the message of a 
group is not equivalent to exclusion based on the protected status of that group. Since GLIB 
was inaugurated with the explicit intention to march in the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day 
Parade, the Council did not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation but rather on the 
content of GLIB’s message. The Council maintained that the members of GLIB could march as 
individuals, not as a group, in the Parade to render application of the public accommodations 
law inappropriate.  
Nevertheless, it is fundamentally antithetical to assume that the exclusive purpose of the 
Parade is to expound upon the Council’s expression: the Parade is an event for the people of 
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Boston, celebrating Boston’s ethno-cultural history, financed by the City of Boston, and is 
associated with Boston, not with the Council. When a government allocates its money, its 
personal property, to a non-governmental entity, the Government expresses its speech through 
the selection a group to receive Parade funds to accrue responsibility over the Parade’s 
orchestration. The Government was presented with two choices prior to its selection “to keep 
the money itself and promote its own message or to give it to private individuals who can use it 
for whatever message they desire” and acquire the Government’s free speech rights within the 
bounds of the monetary restriction of the speech.8 If the Parade is an expressive form of 
speech, then it has a “common theme:”9 to represent all that historically was and currently is 
Boston. The Council is, accordingly, a city-commissioned entity infused with the Boston 
Government’s free speech rights; conversely, the Council is comprised of a cadre of Veterans 
unable to represent the multiethnic composition in membership or, by proxy, in their ideology. 
The Council’s is not a “composer of individual speech” but rather the “common carrier” of the 
“messages of a diverse range of groups forming a series,”10 an onus reinforced because of their 
commission to construe the Parade by the city.  Correspondingly, the Council may organize the 
Parade, but its organizational duty is to transmit the entirety of “messages of a diverse range of 
groups” that are classifiable underneath the common theme. For the Council to exercise its 
individual expression, it would have to march as a discrete group in the series. Thus, the 
exclusion of GLIB is indecorous because it excludes the individuals encompassing a subset of 
the Boston population that, during the typical day, lack a perpetual and tactile presence. The 
fact that Boston continues to sanction the Parade’s organization by the Council in spite of their 
discriminatory beliefs is invidious in its essence. 
                                                     
8 Siedman,Louis Michael. “The Dale Problem: Property and Speech under the Regulatory State.” The University of Chicago Law 
Review. Fall 2008. Pg 1572. In Hurley, the Council has a duty to spend the money provided by Boston at whim but would be in 
dereliction of duty (and likely guilty of defrauding the government) were the money squandered to prevent the Parade from 
occurring. 
9 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 576 (1995) 
10 Stychin, Carl F. “Celebration and Consolidation: National Rituals and the Legal Construction of American Identities” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies. (Summer 1998) Pg 290. 
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The exclusion of GLIB for its expressive nature, not the sexual orientations of its 
constituents, would be merited if the Parade were the Council’s exclusive expression. Since the 
verity that this that the Parade is the amalgamation of discrete units of expressive speech 
representing the whole of the populace of Boston, the Council is neglecting the inherent 
expressive nature of the individual entities comprising the Parade. By stripping GLIB of their 
identifying banner and forcing their members to march facelessly in the Parade whilst 
allowing other organizations to maintain their nonverbal speech rights by displaying their own 
flags, the Council is discriminating against a specific type of person (individuals that identify as 
Irish and gay) by forbidding them to march as a group under a banner while others (like 
individuals that identify as Irish and Catholic) are allowed. Since the difference between GLIB 
and all other participatory units is sexual orientation, the Council is discriminating on the basis 
of sexual orientation. Furthermore, banning GLIB removes the plight of LGBT Irish-Americans, 
a minority group, from the realm of public discourse, the Parade, endorsing the conception 
that identifying as Irish-American concurrently denotes heterosexuality. Madhavi Sunder11 
rephrases the debate, stating that the Court’s decision is akin to “legally protecting speech as 
private space through property-like entitlements including the rights of absolute use, 
exclusivity, and transfer…the Court's approach stems from a romantic view of speakers as 
authors rather than as participants in a social dialogue.” 
The sentiment that the Court is, either consciously or subconsciously, stifling the 
marketplace of ideas by sanctioning the removal of a minority opinion from the sphere of 
public discourse, contravenes the First Amendment’s paramount guarantee of protection from 
the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the Court’s reasoning throughout the remaining segments of 
the opinion, as Sunder chides, “assumes static and essentialist conceptions of identity, speech, 
                                                     
11 Sunder, Madhavi. “Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley 
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.” Stanford Law Review. (November 1996). Pg 147. 
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and culture that are ultimately anathema to a thriving polity and identity politics.”12 The Court 
speciously decrees that the Parade and GLIB have irreconcilable expressive characters, 
precluded from being expressed simultaneously without trampling on the expressive speech 
material of the other.  
Ic. Hurley: Intellectual Property & Monopoly 
The origin of this error lies in the Court’s determination in the second prong of the 
Opinion that, the Council’s conduct does not have the “character of state action” and is 
“purely private.”13 Carl Stychin contextualizes this grave gaffe, bemoaning that the Court’s 
decision upholds the right of one group to construct a parade that reflects and constitutes an 
“authentic national identity;” therefore, the Council accrues the unique ability to 
“circumscribe the Irish community” through their selection of “groups that are consistent with 
what they perceive to be their version of a celebration of St Patrick in their neighbourhood,”14 
determining which sub-identities are acceptable and which are irresoluble. Exclusion from the 
Parade, accordingly, approximates a badge of inferiority within a discrete class of a broad 
ethnic identity. A ritualized and visible parade like that in question in Hurley, is a public good 
and place of public accommodation; if it were the intellectual property of the Council, then the 
State should not be directly financing the accumulation of property for a private entity.  
The Court argues that the Council is akin to a newspaper, offering a “presentation of an 
edited compilation of speech generated by other persons,” so their “selection of contingents to 
make a parade is entitled to similar protection.”15 Conversely, a newspaper is distributed as to 
those that elect to pay for the service, and individuals usually select their newspaper based on 
the newspaper’s message. For example, Washington D.C. has two primary newspapers, The 
                                                     
12 Sunder, Madhavi “Authorship and Autonomy”…Pg 171 
13 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 566 (1995) 
14 Stychin, Carl. “Celebration and Consolidation”…Pg 290 
15 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 570 (1995) 
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Washington Post and The Washington Times. Customers in the city are aware that the former 
has a left-leading slant whereas the latter tends to have more conservative views and select 
which paper to purchase based on this prior knowledge.  
A parade is a “public drama of social relations, and in them performers define…what 
subjects and ideas are available for communication and consideration.”16 Emphatically 
characterizing the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day parade as possessing great “size and 
success” to make it “an enviable vehicle for the dissemination of GLIB’s views,” the Court 
nevertheless feigns the assertion that GLIB “presumably would have had a fair shot…at 
obtaining a parade permit of its own.”17 Demonstrably, the “size and success” of the Parade 
transform it into a large public forum that likely interacts with the individuals normally 
inactive in the political sphere. (By design, parades are presumed to be inclusive of 
sociocultural cleavages since floats, marching bands, and audience camaraderie tend to be 
universally appealing regardless of race, class, sexual orientation, et cetera.); the notion that 
GLIB could attain comparable amounts of exposure and access to the public through the 
orchestration of their own, independent parade as would be conferred through participation in 
the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade is absolutely ludicrous. The history, notoriety, 
publicity, and size of the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade causes it to resemble a 
monopoly18 power: the vast, captive audience of spectators for the Parade is so incomparable 
                                                     
16 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 568 (1995) 
17 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 578 (1995) 
18 In Seidman’s “ The Dale Problem: Property and Speech under the Regulatory State,”(page1598), after a detailed analysis of 
the speech rights as distributed through government action, he remarks that only some property rights are treated “as 
constitutionally fixed in areas like intellectual property, libel, campaign finance, and public forum doctrine.” This signifies that 
the Council, in the opinion of current jurisprudence, cannot be classified as operating as the “public interest” despite a locus 
firmly in the public sphere (through the parade). Resultantly, in spite of the installation of free speech in the Council, they 
cannot constitute a state actor because of their noncommercial character and private membership. Their non-governmental 
character may be challenged on the basis that the Council has received the Parade rights since 1947, materializing as a 
relationship between City and Private Actor that approximates a long-standing contract to redefine the Council as an extension 
of the state: a government-funded organization operating as the city and for the benefit of the city to engender a “public 
entity” inevitably subject to the Massachusetts Public Accommodations law.  Nevertheless, the Council’s decades-long 
monopoly on the Parade and, by proxy, consistently awarded free speech powers as transferred by the City, emits the sensation 
that the Council is the sole shareholder of the parade (a theoretically City-owned intellectual property) to virtually obliterate 
the probability that the Council’s reign be challenged by a viable competitor in Parade’s marketplace for the Parade. With 
complete control over the Parade composition, the Council is quasi-guaranteed victory in the annual contest for the rights to 
the Parade, amounting in the Council’s ability to delineate the boundaries of the public discursive space, silencing minority or 
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that it is nearly impossible for a group denied access to recoup their lost opportunity, silencing 
alternate viewpoints in the public discourse. 
 The Court attempts to distinguish Hurley from Turner Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, a case 
sanctioning Government intervention to limit “monopolistic autonomy” to ensure the “survival 
of broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequently destroyed,”19 by professing 
that the Council does not “enjoy an abiding monopoly of access to spectators” such that GLIB is 
unharmed and capable of sounding its voice regardless of Parade access.20 Monopolies 
produce a product responsive to the consumer’s demands and produced efficiently such that it 
restricts potential viability of new entrants to the market; however, the Council has been 
awarded the Parade permit each year since 1947 (to deter new applicants) yet receives its 
funding from the City of Boston for the Parade (the service it provides) without restrictions on 
content. Thus, without paying consumers to influence the composition of performers or 
competition for the permit, the Council holds a monopoly on the Parade’s expression in a 
manner analogous to Turner Broadcasting. Homosexuality has persisted as long as the human 
race, but its acceptance in the public sphere is hindered whence groups like GLIB are rejected 
as viable representatives of culture, threatening “the survival of speakers”21 by removing their 
claims to legitimacy.  
Arguably, the Parade is a conduit, providing the public forum in which individual 
groups express their own relationships to the overarching theme – the celebration of “Irish-
ness” – and “compelled access” to Parade participation does not, as the Court claims “trespass 
on the organization’s message itself” unless the group wishing to join is unrelated to the 
celebration of “Irish-ness” and all its forms. In granting the Council the sole right to construct 
                                                                                                                                                                           
unpopular groups in the process. 
19 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 577 (1995) 
20 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 578 (1995) 
21 Hurley  U.S. 515 U.S. 577 (1995) 
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the speech and, by proxy, the “social meaning”22 of the Parade, the Council is may fashion 
“Irish-ness” at whim, “insulating a particular conception of identity from criticism…to 
eventually ruin cultural discourse.”23 Simply, if the Court recognizes the expressive nature of a 
parade, that it is a public spectacle, admits no unity in the selection of participants except in 
the celebration of ethnic heritage, then the expressive rights of GLIB are being flouted in 
exclusion to a greater degree than are those of the Council in inclusion. The Court, it follows, 
erred in its decision. 
Id. Hurley:  The Supreme Court’s Unanimous Decision to Discriminate 
 The most unnerving aspects of the Hurley decision was the Court’s validation of one 
“expression” over the other: “the ‘expression of the Veterans Council trumps the competing 
claims of expression and non-discrimination, namely, the equal rights of lesbians, gays, and 
bisexuals to speak as a group within the seemingly public space which has been legally 
constituted as private.”24 Nary a dissent or concurrence in sight, the Court’s consensus denotes 
their belief that identity sociocultural cleavages cannot be fused – that each identity group is 
politicized and imbued with an inextricable, irrefutable meaning – such that an “out” 
individual cannot be seamlessly enveloped by the umbrella of Irish without redefining the 
essential definition of “Irish-ness.” The Court dictated to the State that the magnitude of harm 
caused by the inclusion GLIB in the Parade was so great that it trumped the State’s legitimate 
policy goal of quelling discrimination on the basis of sexual origin in places of public 
accommodation. After Hurley, the Court legitimated the right for private organizations, even 
                                                     
22 Sunder, Madhavi. “Authorship and Autonomy” … Pg.166 
23 Sunder, Madhavi. “Authorship and Autonomy” … Pg. 168; Freedom from criticism harkens back to the monopoly 
metaphor. The Council monopolizes the sphere of public discourse, cobbling together its own vision of the essential meaning 
of being Irish through the composition of the units presented in the Parade. Not only does this further the need for dissent in 
the marketplace of ideas but stymies attempts to provide contestation. Were the Council truly attempting to represent “Irish-
ness” as its primary message, specifically the community of South Boston, then its exclusion of GLIB trespasses on its message 
more so than would GLIB’s inclusion. Since maintenance of the marketplace of ideas was the primary objective underlying the 
inception of the First Amendment, the Court performed a disservice to the essential character of the First Amendment in the 
Hurley decision, instead opting to transform the sphere of public discourse into a private commodity moderated by a singular, 
non-inclusive, private organization. 
24 Stychin, Carl. “Celebration and Consolidation”… Pg. 284 
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those functioning wholly or mostly in the public sphere, to quell intra-group dissent and 
maintain the status quo through the elimination of those with critical or contesting opinions. 
Thus, the right to freedom of expression and association empowers the right to discriminate, 
counterintuitively protecting the ideology of an organization by removing potential threats 
from the discursive space.  
IIa. The Dale Story 
 When James Dale was 8, he joined the Boy Scouts of America through the “Monmouth 
Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142 and joined the ranks of the Cub Scouts’ highest distinction, the 
Order of the Arrow, during his tenure. He transitioned from the Cub Scouts to the Boy Scouts, 
and remained a Boy Scout from ages 11 to 18, achieving the Boy Scouts’ highest honor, the 
rank of Eagle Scout. At 19, his application to be an Assistant Scoutmaster was accepted; 
however, in 1990, about a year later, the Boy Scouts of America revoked his membership due 
to a “concern” he failed to meet the organization’s “high standards of membership.”25 This 
“concern” resulted from a local newspaper article wherein Dale was interviewed as the co-
president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. Thus, despite being a model Cub 
Scout, Boy Scout, and Assistant Scoutmaster, his sexual orientation constituted such a 
considerable violation of the Scouts’ policy as to negate his prior outstanding record. He filed a 
suit against the Boy Scouts, claiming a violation of the New Jersey Public Accommodations Law 
based on the Boy Scouts’ discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
 The Boy Scouts of America is the 12th largest private non-profit organization in the 
United States: its endowment exceeds $2.2 billion, it accrues $155 million yearly in revenues26, 
and its youth members perform about $206,690,025 worth of service (12,000,000 hours)27 in 
                                                     
25 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 665 (2000); Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion 
26Koppelman, Andrew. “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?” Public Affairs Quarterly. October 2004. Pg. 364 




their communities. Its current mission is to “prepare young people to make ethical and moral 
choices over their lifetimes by instilling in them the values of the Scout Oath and Scout Law,”28 
regarding general ethical conduct. To help extend their reach, the organization adopted an 
inclusive membership policy, stipulating that “[n]either the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy 
Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy. ... To meet these responsibilities we have 
made a commitment that our membership shall be representative of all the population in every 
community, district, and council.”29 Established in 1910 and granted a federal charter by 
Congress in 1916, the Boy Scouts currently boasts a membership of over 2.7 million youth and 
an alumni count over 110 million.30 About 50% of all U.S. males aged 7-10 are involved in the 
Cub Scouts; 20% of all U.S. males aged 11-18 are members of the Boy Scouts.  
One of the self-proclaimed “largest and most prominent values-based youth 
development organizations,”31 the Boy Scouts of America professed their belief that 
homosexuality violated provisions of Scout Oath and Law, specifically the mandates that one 
must be “morally straight” and “clean.” Furthermore, the Boy Scouts asserted that New Jersey’s 
forced inclusion of Mr. Dale through their Public Accommodations law would be in violation 
of their right to expressive association; as an organization that did not “want to promote 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,”32 they claimed a right under the First 
Amendment to discriminate in their choice of members. Ultimately, the case, Boy Scouts of 
America et al v. Dale (2000), reached the Supreme Court. The Court overturned the decision of 
the New Jersey State Supreme Court by ruling 5-4 in favor of the Boy Scouts, holding, 
“Applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale 
violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association. Government actions 
                                                     
28 The Boy Scouts of America. “Fact Sheet.” 
http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/sitecore/content/Scouting/About/FactSheets/OverviewofBSA.aspx 
29 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 666 (2000); Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion 
30 Koppelman, Andrew. “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?” Public Affairs Quarterly. October 2004. Pg. 363 
31 The Boy Scouts of America. “About Us.” http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/sitecore/content/Scouting/About.aspx 
32 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 651 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist, majority opinion 
Eitches 14 
 
that unconstitutionally burden that right may take many forms, one of which is intrusion into 
a group's internal affairs by forcing it to accept a member it does not desire.”33 
IIb. Hurley as Precedent for Dale: Transitioning from Private Individuals to Private Association 
 Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Dale harangues that Hurley is only superficially 
similar to the case, and “a closer inspection reveals a wide gulf” between the cases with regard 
to GLIB intent to convey a message and Dale lacking intent to express, the likely public 
perception that the Parade’s components are a function of the Council’s message, and the 
Council’s desire to express their message at a specific temporal place “and a right to refuse to 
contradict or garble its own specific statement.”34 Although Part I elucidated potential flaws 
with the Court’s logic regarding the Hurley decision, many First Amendment scholars posit 
that the Court’s decision was not partial against GLIB’s views. Instead, they argue that the 
Court appraised the Council as a “fundamentally private organization” that, through the 
selection and rejection of Parade participants, promote their conception of what “is” and 
“should” constitute “Irish-ness” in Boston: the Council’s expression is in essence the 
summation of each the distinct ideology exhibited by the hand-selected Parade participants, 
denoting that forced inclusion of GLIB or other groups counter to the Council’s vision would 
tarnish both the Council’s agenda and “traditional values” of the parade. As its sole 
constructor, the Parade is unescapably a function of the Council’s agenda; consequently, the 
average spectator is unable to disassociate the discrete elements of the Parade from the 
Council’s message, signifying that GLIB or other “forced” Parade participants will necessarily 
frustrate the audience’s proper interpretation of the council’s agenda. Summarily, the Court 
ruled based on each organization’s action in lieu of their message’s content. Even though 
lenient standards guided the Council’s selection of organizations acceded to march, with 
regard to their expression, their choice to reject is as important as their choice to include. 
                                                     
33 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist, majority opinion 
34 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 696 (2000); Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion 
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Michael Osborne, a pro-Hurley/anti-Dale scholar, remarked, “the Hurley Court 
correctly held that a private club could not force another private club to include it in the 
latter's public parade where doing so would compel certain speech by the club sponsoring the 
parade... GLIB wanted to use the parade as a platform from which it could propound its views 
and have them be seemingly backed by the sponsoring organization's imprimatur.”35 The 
Court’s decision in Hurley, to some scholars, is thoroughly independent from the issue of 
sexual orientation. Massaro avers that, arising from GLIB’s declared intention to participate in 
the Parade in order to propagate cognizance of LGBT individuals within the Irish-American 
community of Boston, GLIB cannot be disassociated from their expressive purpose – GLIB is 
expressive conduct and, resultantly, their inclusion in the Parade would permeate and alter the 
Council’s expressive conduct regardless of the subject of their paramount issue. Sexual 
orientation and free speech typically trigger “intermediate scrutiny” in judicial review, 
erstwhile race, routinely designated a “suspect” class, mandates “strict scrutiny.” Despite the 
high degree of protection afforded to stymie state/government actors from making invidious, 
racially-charged distinctions in the public sphere, Massaro contends that if GLIB were 
representative of a racial minority with the same expressed conduct, the Hurley Court would 
subvert the expression of a highly protected class to safeguard the Council’s freedom of 
association rights from the threat of “forced expression” through inclusion of ideologically-
irreconcilable groups: “In fact, Hurley implies that the same result would follow had the 
parade officials chosen to bar African-American floats, instead of gay American floats.”36  
Essentially, Hurley concedes that “government cannot regulate the content of private 
actors’ speech/association decisions, no matter how distasteful that content may be;”37 ergo, 
the stage for the majority opinion of the Court in Dale wherein minority rights are eliminated 
to maintain the majority status quo. If a private organization has freedom of association rights 
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in the manufacture of its membership, their First Amendment rights will triumph over any 
State-issued anti-discrimination law to stagnate cultural dissent in the continual process of 
ideological formulation of a group through removal of dissent whilst simultaneously rendering 
obsolete the weapon previously employed to combat unequal access for minorities.  
Further deleterious is the Court’s assertion that a group is not obliged to declare a 
cohesive message, or retain a message whatsoever, as a precondition for the right to 
discriminate in their membership policy. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor illuminated this creed 
in her 1984 concurrence in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, which was wholeheartedly 
adopted by the Court in the Hurley decision, stating: “Protection of the association’s right to 
define its membership derives from recognition that the formation of an expressive association 
is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice.”38 
O’Connor continues this sentiment by decreeing citizen “control the content of public 
discussion” to be the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment; following, the hypothetical 
instance whence government action restricts an individual group’s access to realm of public 
discussion materializes as a caustic violation of the First Amendment, as Hurley concludes. 
With Hurley’s veneration of the “general rule of speaker autonomy”39 the private entity is 
imbued with the choice “not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is 
presumed to lie beyond the government power to control.”40 
In Roberts, O’Connor bequeaths the same degree of free speech protection to an 
individual person and to an association, equating the two in the “public discussion” arena, and 
consolidating an organization of multitudinous persons into a singular and cohesive individual 
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Eitches 17 
 
entity41. Undoubtedly, each person, distinctive in their ideology as a consequence of each 
inimitable experience comprising their lifelong socialization cycle, is enveloped within the 
group-turned-super-individual entity, imparting two potential effects per object: the 
individual can either 1) separate from the group and express their full range of postulations 
and opinions or 2) remain in the group to enjoy the power of expressive association yet lose 
their ability to express incongruous aspects of their identity; the group-turned-super-
individual can either 1) fail or succeed at harmonizing the myriad inharmonious units from 
which it is comprised or 2) discriminate by eradicating individuals most threatening to 
harmony, bolstering the probability for long-run group stability.  
IIc. Hurley as Precedent: Facts Diverge, Yet Opinions Converge  
Regardless of whether the Court in Hurley erred with the decision, Hurley remains a 
poor precedent for Dale. Osborne’s aforementioned dichotomous approach to the cases guided 
the trajectory underlying his ultimate resolve, positing that while Hurley was a sound decision, 
the majority in Dale “incorrectly relied on Hurley in finding that the Boy Scouts had a 
constitutional right to discriminate against homosexuals.”42 The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
their Dale decision, decided prior to that of the Court, concurred with Osborne’s supposition 
and concluded that the Boy Scouts of America’s lawyers were incorrect to center their case 
around Hurley as precedent because “the reinstatement of Dale does not compel the Boy Scouts 
to express any message.”43The Court’s fallacious implementation of Hurley manifests through 
three dichotomies between the major facts of the cases: 1) forced expression altering an 
association’s collective expressive activity versus an association’s membership composition; 2) 
exposure, propagation, and intensity of homophobic message’s expression; and 3) the public-
private character of the association. The end ruling in the cases legitimated the right of 
expressive associations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without violating 
                                                     
41 Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 468 U.S. 634 (1984) 
42 Osborne, Michael T. “Erecting Prejudice”…Pg525 
43 160 N.J., at 624, 734 A. 2d, at 1229 
Eitches 18 
 
public accommodations laws; synchronously, Dale’s divergence from Hurley was significant 
enough that the Court vaulted from a unanimous opinion to a split 5-4 vote in Dale. 
Elaborating on the first factual dichotomy, Hurley depicts one expressive association 
aspiring to participate in another expressive association’s collective expressive activity without 
the consent of the latter group, materializing as the “forced participation” of GLIB in the 
Council’s articulation of their expressive agenda through the Parade.44 GLIB did not desire 
membership in or a merger with the Council; the Council, because of their conflicting 
ideologies, probably did not have any GLIB members apply for membership. GLIB merely 
wanted to use the forum of the Parade to express a sentiment to the public, but the Council’s 
exclusive rights to author the Parade intentionally prohibited GLIB access; therefore, exclusion 
became intertwined with their speech goals. GLIB’s expressive message, as an association 
remained, intact without inclusion in the Parade; their exclusion and the Court’s decision may 
have strengthened GLIB’s expressive agenda and their resolve carve a niche in cultural fabric 
of “Irish-ness” for LGBT-identified individuals. 
In Dale, Mr. Dale is stripped of a piece of his identity through his expulsion from the 
Boy Scouts; Mr. Dale lost his ability to participate and possibly alter the cultural definition of 
the Boy Scouts, akin to GLIB, and his identity as a Boy Scout. Mr. Dale’s expression is 
constricted against his will, maligning the liberty theoretical coffered by the First Amendment: 
Dale and other gay Boy Scouts and Troop leaders are forced to “choose to keep their 
association with the other boy scouts,” sequestering their gay identity in exchange for the right 
to associate with the Boy Scouts of America, or “surrender their right of association with other 
boy scouts by identifying themselves as homosexuals.”46 In the case of Mr. Dale, the Boy Scouts 
of America’s discrimination is psychological warfare because it deprives Mr. Dale of the 
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“satisfaction of personal fellowship” provided by expressive associations like the Boy Scouts47, 
repossesses, complicates his interpersonal relationships with group members, forbids the 
personal gratification found in membership solidarity, and obligates a reevaluation of self-
identification.  In short, Hurley  targets a group for their message whilst Dale “seeks to keep an 
outsider out of its ranks,”48 exiling the individual because of their immutable characteristics. 
The psychological harm generated by expulsion from Boy Scouts of America is 
compounded with those arising from the second factual dichotomy. Almost humorously, 
Osborne recounts that, if the Boy Scouts of America had spent more time acting openly 
homophobic, linking their “claimed anti-homosexual policy to one of [their] central purposes” 
or informed more than a small handful of individuals at national headquarters that such an 
“anti-homosexual policy” existed,49 the Court’s vote would have been more cohesive and the 
dissenting opinion would have been devoid of much of its ammunition.50The Council has been 
less glib in purporting their anti-gay stance. After a court order was issued mandating GLIB’s 
inclusion, Mr. Hurley opted to cancel the parade in lieu of enabling the group to participate, 
stating “They’re not going to shove something down our face that’s not our traditional 
values.”51 In comparison, the Boy Scouts’ sporadic, meeker espousal of an anti-gay stance, in 
comparison to the Council’s constant avowal of discontent with homosexuality, furthered the 
perception that “the compelled inclusion of a homosexual scoutmaster”52 would not be 
deleterious to the Boy Scouts’ expressive speech rights. The Council’s fevered hatred of 
homosexuality is less intrusive on the individual level as its impact is dispersed among the 
constituents of GLIB. Mr. Dale’s increased psychological harm stems from the Boy Scout’s 
unwavering committal to his removal from the ranks of the association. By refusing to readmit 
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Mr. Dale in response to his post-expulsion suit and opting to pursue litigation, the Boy Scouts 
of America implied that “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the 
organization to send a message”53 so antithetical to the Boy Scouts’ essential values that it 
would imperil the associative expression of the entire organization and its members.  
The third factual dichotomy derives from the Hurley and Dale assertion that the 
Council and the Boy Scouts of America, respectively, are exempt from their state’s public 
accommodations law as private, noncommercial expressive organizations. Many legal scholars 
theorize that an organization is classifiable as an “expressive group” if it is “expressive” 
through engagement in a protected class of speech within the First Amendment, a group 
consisting of “people acting in concert”.54 The scope of protection afforded to expressive 
associations under the First Amendment varies according to the “ability of the organization to 
play its social role:”55 The greatest degree of protection is afforded to intimate associations, 
comprised by relatively few people and highly selective in “decisions to begin and maintain” 
affiliation,56while the least protection is afforded to commercially-oriented organizations. If an 
organization falls somewhere between public/commercial and intimate association, it is 
considered expressive by the Court; the State utilizes discretion in its determination of which 
expressive associations or expressive conduct necessitate regulation as places of public 
accommodation. 
In Hurley, both the Council and GLIB are classifiable as expressive associations. 
Furthermore, both are geographically concentrated, non-commercial groups with restrictions 
to membership: GLIB is comprised of identifying as “openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
individuals…in the community” of Boston and the Council is an “unincorporated association 
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of individuals elected from various veterans groups.”57 Accordingly, each organization may 
attract a finite number of individuals, bounded by location and by a belief/identity; it is not 
likely that non-veterans would be members of the Council or non-LGBT identifiers or allies to 
be in GLIB. The organizations are “horizontally oriented” because a given individual member 
has the same theoretical ability to influence the association’s choice of expressive speech and 
message as does any other member. The same elements that restrict their memberships 
simultaneously restrict their ability to significantly influence the lives of non-members. As 
acknowledged by the Court, a parade, as a general entity, is a form of expressive speech that, 
“if large enough and a source of benefits (apart from its expression),”58 can behave as a place 
of public accommodation. St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade similarly provides a 
“public” service, but is not a place of public accommodation for two reasons: 1) the Council is 
such an explicitly expressive association, so its choice of Parade’s composition is expressive 
speech; and 2) the Council’s expressive message  protrudes into the public sphere once per 
year, temporally truncating its capacity to exert a societal force significant enough to merit 
government regulation as a place of public accommodation. 
In contrast, the Boy Scouts of America’s membership size, geographic distribution, 
cultural influence, commercial interests, tax emptions, Congressional charter, lack of a 
political affiliation, nonsectarian religion, and inclusive membership policy muddle the 
demarcation between private/public and commercial/noncommercial expressive 
associations.59 The Boy Scouts’ presence in the public arena is almost constant, whether 
through volunteer services, utilizing public facilities, or through the vast number of the 
organization’s alumni inculcated with the organization’s specific moral agenda. 
Osbournesdjfns characterizes the Boy Scouts as “a vertically integrated national corporation 
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with tight control over its local and regional subsidiaries;”60 moreover, this elucidates that the 
actions of an individual have little influence on the trajectory or expressed message of the 
organization. Rather, the organization’s expressive message and its articulation method is 
determined by an elite cadre of members and imposed on its members. If a person’s share in 
the marketplace of ideas is determined by the number of people in the marketplace, and the 
discursive conduct in the marketplace manifests as a group’s expressive message, accordingly, 
a member of the Council will accrue a greater share in their group’s expression than will a Boy 
Scout. The Boy Scouts engage in a substantial amount of commercial activity, including the sale 
of products to the public and paid employment of copious people, and expressive activity to 
“be an example of a third category of quasi-expressive associations,”61 a reality which the 
Court failed to address in their decision. 
IIIa. Dale: The Court in Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale 
Hurley, it has been shown, was an improper use of precedent for Dale, but the majority 
opinion in Dale embodies pernicious jurisprudence for reasons independent of Hurley. This 
section aims to address those flaws. First, the majority critically erred by deferring to the Boy 
Scouts of America’s avowed conceptions of their expressive message as their actual expressive 
message. Second, the majority failed to concede that the Boy Scouts of America qualifies as a 
place of public accommodation. Third, the Court championed the rights of the private 
association to expression over the private individual’s liberty rights. The Court would have 
been better served in the usage of Roberts v. United States Jaycees as precedent to avoid the 
aforementioned problems, the previous standard precedent for Freedom of Association for 
organizations significantly affecting the public sphere with large, nonexclusive membership 
policies that discriminate on the basis of an attribute unrelated to organizational expression. 
Whereas Hurley directly affected the public sphere through the Parade’s presentation of 
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performers to the spectatorship, Dale’s consequences are not geographically or temporally 
concentrated to legitimate the discriminatory policies of any private, noncommercial 
organization. Dale, like Roberts, implicates the future trajectory of society with its decision, 
extending overseas, while lacking the explicitly expressive type of actor as embodied by GLIB. 
The majority opinion first evaluated the expressed values of the Boy Scouts. Following, 
it evaluated whether forced inclusion of Mr. Dale would impose an undue burden on the Boy 
Scouts’ expressive agenda. It found the Boy Scouts to profess an expressive agenda that 
prohibited the inclusion of homosexual individuals, and by “merely [engaging] in expressive 
activity that could be impaired,” Boy Scouts were protected as an expressive association from 
State intrusion. Furthermore, the Boy Scouts’ chosen method of expression is protected, and the 
Boy Scouts’ do not need a uniform view between its members on an issue for it to be a form of 
protected expression. Instead of utilizing an intermediate standard of review to weigh the 
competing interests, the Court opted to apply a “traditional First Amendment analysis” as 
employed in Hurley. The Court decried the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey as 
adjudicating based on disapproval of the Boy Scouts’ message instead of to uphold the First 
Amendment. Justice Stevens and Justice Souter each penned dissenting opinions to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion. The decision has proven to be quite unpopular among legal 
scholars, with the American Bar Association filing an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Dale.62 
IIIb. Dale and the Boy Scouts’ “Expressed Values” 
 The Boy Scouts “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive purpose,”63 
discussed in part IIa, augments the breadth of the Court’s opinion in both geographic and 
socio-cultural terms through the quasi-assurance that a Boy Scout Troop will permeate almost 
any given neighborhood. Disregarding race, religion, socioeconomic status, and other cleaving 
factors, the requirements for admission are simply to live and abide by the “Scout’s Oath” and 
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the “Scout Law.” The “Scout Law” reads: “A Scout is: Trustworthy Obedient Loyal Cheerful 
Helpful Thrifty Friendly Brave Courteous Clean Kind Reverent.”64 The “Scout’s Oath” mandates 
that, “to do my duty to God and country,” a Boy Scout must obey by the “Scout’s Law,” keeping 
themselves “physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.”65 The Scout Handbook 
includes the official Boy Scouts of America definition of the terms of the “Scout’s Law” 
alongside examples of such conduct, providing Scouts with an unambiguous manual to guide 
one’s choices in life. The Scoutmasters are required to embody both the values of the Law and 
Code, “both expressly and through example,” and are provided with a denser, more explicit 
version of the Scouts Handbook, The Scoutmasters Handbook, to help Scoutmasters properly 
instill a “system of values” in their underlings.66 Through scouting activities, like camping and 
hiking, guided by Scoutmasters, the Scouts are inculcated with the moral values necessary for 
good citizenship: “patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred values.”67  
Scouts are taught to accept the intrinsic differences between people; Scoutmasters are 
selectively chosen by the Boy Scouts because their adherence to organization’s values are 
steadfast, thus enabling them to effectively communicate the views of the organization onto the 
children. It was for this reason, combined with him exemplary scouting record, that Mr. Dale 
was selected to lead the Scouts of his troop into morality. Conversely, it was his adherence to 
the “morally straight” provision of the Scout Handbook, in combination with the morals 
previously entrenched within him by his Scoutmaster during his youth, that caused him to “do 
what his head and his heart [told] him [was] right”68 through gay rights advocacy. The Boy 
Scouts maintain that “morally straight” and “clean” are indicative of an anti-homosexuality 
message disseminated by the organization as their expressive speech; their expressive conduct 
involved the removal of Mr. Dale, a member they believed to be a personification of expressive 
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speech, to prevent the Boy Scouts of America from sending a message contrary to their beliefs 
implying the organization’s “accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”69 
Although the Boy Scouts’ attestation to an anti-homosexuality policy as plainly deduced from 
the Scout’s Oath and Scout’s Law is questionable, the Boy Scouts submitted a 1978 statement 
from their then-president to the executive committee of the organization, elucidating its moral 
stance that “homosexuality and professional or non-professional employment in Scouting are 
not appropriate,” to the Court to justify their decision to terminate Mr. Dale. The anti-
homosexuality decree was not forwarded to lower levels of the vertical organization. 
After their decision to expel Mr. Dale, the Boy Scouts professed that their associational 
rights to expression would have been burdened in the event that New Jersey’s Law against 
Discrimination (LAD) legally compelled them to absorb an “avowed homosexual”70 back into 
their group. In the Scoutmasters Handbook, it overtly states that Scoutmasters are not to 
“instruct Scouts… in the subject of sex and family life. The reasons are that it is not construed 
to be Scouting's proper area,”71 in the handful of instances where sexuality is discussed in the 
Handbooks, the references serve to discourage teenage pregnancy, sex before marriage, and 
sexually transmitted diseases.72 Sexual conduct is addressed only within the discussion of what 
constitutes sexual abuse: the Youth Protection Program….. Seemingly, the program was 
initiated by concerns raised by Boy Scouts of Am. v. Teal73, a case involving a Scoutmaster, 
allegedly homosexual, that sexually abused his Scouts. In 1991, the Washington Times 
investigated the Boy Scouts, finding that over 350 men were banned for “sexual misconduct” 
between 1971 and 198674; a probable impetus for the 1978 statement illustrating Boy Scout’s 
aversion to “homosexual conduct.” For the same reason, further reinforced by exclusion based 
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on “homosexual conduct” in lieu of sexual orientation, it is likely that the Boy Scouts’ policy is 
partially derived from the fear that gay leaders will “convert” the youth to homosexuality or 
otherwise prey on their vulnerability.75 This reprehensible stereotype likely “justifies” the Boy 
Scouts’ revocation of adult membership for any person involved in “advocacy of the morality 
of homosexuality to youth,”76 but the exclusion of homosexuals is warranted, as in Mr. Dale’s 
case, regardless of any indication of spreading a pro-gay agenda.  
The Court determined the Boy Scouts’ explicit aversion to homosexual conduct publicly 
stated “by its assertions in prior litigation,”77 particularly in a case with similar facts from filed 
in the early 1980s, and in four policy statements written after Mr. Dale’s expulsion that were 
difficult to attain and of ambiguous authorship. 78 In the first three policy statements, 
“homosexual conduct” is deemed to be inconsistent with the tenets of the Scout’s Oath and 
Law. In the last policy statement of the four, issued in 1993, the Boy Scouts abandoned their 
attempt to utilize the Scout’s Oath and Law to support an anti-homosexual agenda, instead 
decreeing that homosexuals are inconsistent with the expectations that “Scouting families have 
had for the organization” and cannot be appropriate leaders or role models within the 
organization.79 Without an investigation into the stimuli necessitating their discriminatory 
policies or an acknowledgement of the fact that the organization may have penned their 
policies in anticipation and submitted amicus briefs as a preemptive strike in the event of 
legislative action,80 the Court tacitly scorned the legitimate possibility that non-uniformity of 
views within the organization appears between actors at the highest level of organization. The 
Court stated that they needn’t examine the group’s written statements to extract or certify 
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expressive purpose, qualifying its (minimal) review of the association’s written assertions as an 
implication of sincerity in their message.81 
However, the Court desecrated the integrity of the First Amendment in applying the 
Hurley-analysis to the case, ceasing their inquiry into the nature of the Boy Scouts’ “expression 
with respect to homosexuality” after deferring to the Boy Scouts’ assertion that “homosexual 
conduct” violates the Scout’s Law and Oath as evidence. Instead of evaluating the Boy Scouts’ 
expressive activities to determine whether an undue burden would be placed on the 
organization in the forced acceptance, the Court took the Boy Scouts’ avowal that Mr. Dale’s 
inclusion would be an onus as a statement of fact, preemptively rejecting the postulation that a 
sufficient state interest could be an impingement on expressive association. Ergo, Dale carved 
the framework, fashioning a two-step test to govern First Amendment protection for expressive 
associations: 1) arriving at a conclusion as to whether a group is an expressive association, 
then 2) deciding whether their expressive agenda’s advancement is hindered by the inclusion 
of that person.82 
Andrew Koppelman laments that this decision vindicated the Boy Scouts’ for their 
discrimination, making them the “single largest entity in the United States that excludes gay 
people on the basis of their identity, and justifies this exclusion on the basis of gays' own 
purported moral failings.”83 With their acceptance of an “official policy” to discriminate, the 
Court failed to note whether the policy was established: whether the amalgam of Government, 
Religious, or Educational entities providing the Scouts’ funding knew that they were, in effect, 
funding homophobia84.  Adopting a policy is not akin to applying a policy; the latter indicates 
consent of the membership body. At 22 years old during Dale, only an argument of static 
associational values could legitimize the assumption that the 1978 statement’s views retained 
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validity at the time of the case85; thus, none of the presented documents can logically 
substantiate the veracity of a present-day message on homosexuality. 
Carpenter contends that the “primary purpose of the members in coming together as an 
association can be determined by examining what they actually do when they associate;”86 an 
organization's "universe of viewpoints" by definition, and by proxy, its expressive speech is 
inherently intended to be the amalgamation of the 2.7 million plus Scouts and their parents.87 
Associational freedom originated from the need to empower the individual through group 
speech in the ever-expanding marketplace of ideas; the Court’s top-down view of expressive 
conduct in associations delegates the rights of the masses to an elite cadre wholly removed 
from those it regulates. The Boy Scouts identify the “family,” or the unit level, as the rationale 
for its discriminatory policies, decreeing that homosexuals are inconsistent with the 
expectations that “Scouting families have had for the organization” and cannot be role models 
through leadership within the organization.88 Yet, as Mr. Dale eloquently stated, “People don't 
join the Boy Scouts because they're antigay. People join the Boy Scouts because they want 
acceptance, they want community.”89 Members of the Boy Scouts, as an ensemble, do not 
associate for purposes even tangential to promoting an anti-homosexual agenda, if at all90; 
conversely, the choice for an individual to join an organization stems from philosophical like-
mindedness and accrued benefit to membership.  
To truly give “deference of an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression,”91 the Court should not have focused on the opinions of the cadre of elites fully 
removed from Dale, which promulgate an agenda based irrational fear and/or hatred of 
                                                     
85 Sunder, Madhavi. “Cultural Dissent.” Stanford Law Review. (December 2001). Pg 548-550 
86 Carpenter, Dale. “Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale…Pg 1573 
87 Edgar, Christopher. “The Right to Freedom of Expressive”…Pg 219 
88 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 666 (2000); Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion 
89 Sunder, Madhavi. “Cultural Dissent.”…pg 545 
90 Brief of the American Bar Association. Pg 9-10.:“Boy Scout members associate in order to promote a certain set of moral 
values, of which the view that homosexuality is immoral is merely a small part.”; “Boy Scouts expresses a belief in moral 
values and uses its activities to encourage the moral development of its members.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223. But, as that court 
noted, encouraging “moral development” does not reflect a specific view on homosexuality, any more than it does on abortion, 
the use of contraceptives, divorce, euthanasia, or myriad other controversial moral issues on which BSA has no stated 
position.”  
91 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 653 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority 
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homosexuals, instead of attending to the organization’s definition of expressive message at the 
troop level. Mr. Dale’s troop is the only entity where the Boy Scout’s alleged “forced 
expression” could hypothetically transpire, so the community would allow for an estimation of 
the actual effect of a State-mandated alteration of an association’s expressive message. The 
local members of the community could recount their perceptions of Mr. Dale, gauging 
whether he is an adequately visible individual in both communities, gay and Scout, to 
necessarily fuse their meanings together and “compel” speech. 
Justice Stevens, in the dissent opines, “Because a number of religious groups do not 
view homosexuality as immoral or wrong and reject discrimination against homosexuals, it is 
exceedingly difficult to believe that BSA nonetheless adopts a single particular religious or 
moral philosophy when it comes to sexual orientation.”92 The Boy Scouts employ a charter 
system, wherein some of their local units are organized and operated by independent 
associations; the second largest charter by total youth membership is the United Methodist 
Church (UMC) with 371,499 Scouts93, approximately 14% of the entire Boy Scout 
membership. The UMC filed an amici curia brief, detailing their opposition to the Boy Scout’s 
professed message, to attest that the “actual views of BSA members” do not hold homosexuality 
and Scouting to be in conflict; moreover, they posited that the Boy Scouts’ discrimination 
conflicted with their interpretation of the expressive message, which they perceive to promote 
the values of “trustworthiness, loyalty, and kindness.”94 With so many discrete entities 
“franchising” Boy Scouts’ troops, the views in the Boy Scouts’ “Official Position” cannot be 
construed as the organization’s actual expressive agenda tenants or as the majority sentiment. 
                                                     
92 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 696 (2000); Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion 
93 The Boy Scouts of America. “Charter Organizations.” 
http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/sitecore/content/Scouting/About/FactSheets/operating_orgs.aspx 
94 Brief of Amicus Curiae, General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, et al. at 3, Boy Scouts of Am. 
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2001) (No. 99-699) 
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The consequence of the Court’s deference to leaders is the reinforcement of the ideologies of 
the “powerful within cultural associations.”95 
The Court is correct in holding that an “association need not associate for the ‘purpose’ 
of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired 
in order to be entitled to protection.”96 In applying that mantra to the Boy Scouts, the Court 
made a critical error by protecting a discriminatory membership policy wholly unrelated to 
achieving their articulated membership goals or fulfilling their associational agenda. An 
organization propounding an inclusive membership policy, discouraging of the discussion of 
sexual orientation, religiously “non-sectarian,” and politically neutral with a primary objective 
is to  build morals and install a moral code in male youth through non-sexual activities such as 
camping does not have a logical reason to practice discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Such a discrimination would alienate potential members, religious organizations, 
political affiliations, and, obviously, LGBT individuals and allies. The Court is accurate in the 
observation that an expressive association has the right to choose its method of expression; 
however, the Boy Scouts, for copious reasons97, are not purely an expressive association and 
cannot be properly assessed as such.  
Mr. Dale still possessed the same qualities as a human being that elicited his effective 
leadership in the Boy Scouts from age 8 until his dismissal; based on his previous action, there 
was indication that he mingled his sexual orientation with his role as Scoutmaster. He began 
the preponderance of his publicly expressive activities as a result of the discrimination he 
experienced directly because of the Boy Scouts’ discriminatory policy. “The majority did not 
                                                     
95 Sunder, Madhavi. “Cultural Dissent.”…pg 553 
96 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 653 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority 
97 The Boy Scouts participate in commercial enterprises, such as selling uniforms and memorabilia, which provide it less 
associational protection under the First Amendment as per Roberts v. United States Jaycees. If exclusion of an individual from 
an organization could result in economic ramifications, like the inability to gain certain social networking advantages or 
tactical skill building, then the organization does not enjoy the same rights as would an intimate expressive organization 
orientated toward and deriving benefits purely from other members. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, an exact definition of 
intimate expressive associations is not given but is implied to be related to intimate bonds such as marriage. 
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find (and could not have found) as a matter of binding fact at that stage of the litigation that 
the Boy Scouts expressly inculcated a particular moral view of gay sexuality,”98 and there is no 
indication that Mr. Dale would have been required to transmit any message on 
heterosexuality. If the Boy Scouts expressly communicated an anti-homosexual agenda to 
anyone outside the organization’s cadre, then their words could be adjudicated at face value. 
In the absence of such a conduct, this paper posits that the Boy Scouts refused to make a 
concerted effort to inform the organization’s mass of their views because they feared that their 
policy would result in a significant decline in the number of received government contracts, 
increasing the costs of sustaining to the organization.99  
Part IIIc. The State’s Interest 
“It is a statistical certainty that tens of thousands of the boys in the Scouts will grow up 
to be gay,” remarks Koppelman,100 and the State has a vested interest in certifying that, first, 
the mental health of these children is not eroded by the spread of a cancerous majority opinion 
implying the inferiority of gays, as a plausible result of mass diffusion of views like those 
articulated by in the Boy Scouts’ policy. Secondly, the State has an interest in limiting the 
arbitrary exclusion of gay youth from institutions that could endow them with community 
building skills,  participation with peers, access to a large and influential network  of former 
members, encourage a “lifetime of engaged citizenship,”101 as purportedly attainable through 
membership in the Boy Scouts. The lack of an “immediate” conference of commercial 
advantage to struggling children, regardless of sexuality102, does not preclude the deprivation 
to which they are subjected.103 
                                                     
98 Clark, Stephen. “Judicially Straight?”…Pg591  
99 Edgar, Christopher. “The Right to Freedom of Expressive”…Pg 229: “A governmental act "deters" a person from engaging]in 
an activity when, as a result of that action, the person engages in the activity less often than he did before. However, the mere 
fact that the government makes taking a certain action more costly for a private party-thus requiring that party to expend 
more time, resources, and effort than it otherwise would have expended-does not necessarily mean that the government's 
action will cause the private party to engage in the activity in question less often”. 
100 Koppelman, Andrew. “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?” Public Affairs Quarterly. October 2004. Pg 375 
101 Brief of the American Bar Association. Pg 15 
102 Deprivation as a result of social stigma for gay children, lack of an interactive forum between gay youth and straight youth 
to exacerbate oppression, and the lack of access to gay role models to ease the confusion imbedded in individual sexual 
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In Dale, the Court quotes an earlier decision, Robert v. Jaycees, to elucidate the tension 
inherent between the State’s “compelling interest” and a person’s “right to associate with 
others in pursuit of a  wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends.”104 In the interest of democracy, the right to expressive association “[preserves] 
political and cultural diversity” while simultaneously “shielding dissident expression from the 
majority.”105 The government’s ability to operate for the “public good” is generated by 
contestation in the “public voice;”106 however, when minority opinion is quashed by the 
“public voice,” the government, in the interest of its own efficacy, must act to reestablish 
minority opinion. Thus “large or otherwise important” expressive associations are “important 
centers of norm-formation,”107 a qualification undoubtedly met by the Boy Scouts.  
 “Antidiscrimination laws, like other regulations of conduct, mediate conflicts between 
people who do not live in isolation from one another and whose conduct may injure each 
other;”108 they protect the ability to dissent to shield the unequivocal promotion of “an 
approved message or [discouragement] of a disfavored one,”109 monitoring conduct that could 
destabilize the marketplace of ideas through impermissible silencing of a group without 
majority power. Historically, the First Amendment has protected the rights of people with a 
minority sexual orientation, providing avenues for them to escape legislation inspired by the 
heteronormative conception of the “good life”110 and to associate with like-minded people, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
orientation. 
103 Brief of the American Bar Association. Pg 9-10.14 
104 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 653 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority  
105 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 653 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority; Here, the Court’s 
decision does not further or protect minority views, rather sustaining the views of the majority and protecting those views 
from the threat of cultural irrelevancy (as the Boy Scouts are major centers of culture) 
106 Madison, James. Federalist X. :“The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, 
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. 
Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the People, will be 
more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the People themselves, convened for the purpose… Extend the 
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will 
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” 
107 Carpenter, Dale. “Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale…Pg 1535 
108 Clark, Stephen. “Judicially Straight?”…Pg 562 
109 Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 653 (2000); Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority  
110 Carpenter, Dale. “Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale…Pg 1519 
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bolstering group strength through a numerical increase that, in turn, correlates with an 
increase in group socio-political power. By affixing its associational mission to the 
indoctrination of a set of morals in its youth membership, the Boy Scouts are properly deemed 
an expressive association; moreover, it is because of this expression, coupled with their high 
visibility and utilization of governmental and private finance and property to achieve these 
goals that simultaneously causes the Boy Scouts to function as a place of public 
accommodation.  
For organizations intertwined with the public sphere, exit is not a feasible method to 
indicate dissent if the organization provides a “public good.”111The Boy Scouts have, over more 
than a century, honed their power to coerce public opinion and culture through their visibility 
and myriad of alumni.  If the Boy Scouts are accorded the exclusive ability to proselytize their 
moral code to half of all six-to-ten year olds, all of whom are in the midst of their ideological 
formations, then the State has an inherent interest in restricting their expression. The Court’s 
task in Dale was to evaluate the State’s interest against the professed organizational interests; 
conversely, in the dereliction of this duty, the Court hypocritically “failed to apply its usual 
deference to a facially neutral law that had the effect of protecting the rights of gay men and 
lesbians,”112 and solidified the ability of majority views to flood the marketplace of ideas. Even 
if the Boy Scouts are “silent” within the organization’s educational duties on sexuality, their 
silence neglects addressing the unique needs of sexually confused children while rejecting the 
notion that alternative sexual orientations are normal and not to be chastised. 
In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Court regarded educational facilities as 
“the very foundation of good citizenship,” citing that such facilities play a unique and 
important role in society through norm formation that forces “discrimination in education to 
                                                     
111 Koppelman, Andrew. “Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?” Public Affairs Quarterly. October 2004. Pg 377 
112 Siedman,Louis Michael. “The Dale Problem”…Pg1560  
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be especially pernicious.”113 Although Brown deals with public education, the Boy Scouts’ 
admission policies are inclusive, the organization is permitted to use public schools as 
recruiting grounds; and their expressive activity teaches youth useful life skills; hence, it would 
not be ludicrous to conjecture that they could be regulated with a modicum of the magnitude 
with which State public schools are monitored. The State has an interest in regulating the Boy 
Scouts as an educational institution; therefore, their assertion of a discriminatory belief cannot 
validate their right to discriminate because their impact is not confined to their organization’s 
members. Lim argues, in contrast, that  the State “does not rely on the Boy Scouts to prepare 
the young for citizenship”114 as they do public educational facilities; however, the Boy Scouts 
were chartered by the Government and enjoy special relationships with the Government 
because the Boy Scouts function as, at a minimum, a resource to further the citizenship-related 
mission of schools. Exclusion from a scouting trip does not directly affect “the equitable 
distribution of goods and services in a society”115 to automatically sanction discretionary State 
action, but the State interest is palpable and important; the Court’s decision to ignore the 
possibility of State interest permeating free association without triggering a First Amendment 
violation gravely underestimates the roles of social organizations in the creation of cultural 
fabric.  
Koppelman ponders “not whether the leadership is pure in heart, but whether it is 
using its enormous cultural power in a way that reinforces a pollution-based prejudice,” 
concluding that the Boy Scouts’ cadre of executives manipulate the organization to trumpet 
their specific views of intrinsic inferiority of gay persons116; they terminated Mr. Dale’s 
employment without knowing if he actually engaged in “homosexual conduct,” chose not to 
allow the individual charter organizations to profess a moral view on homosexuality according 
                                                     
113 Kavey, Michael. “Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to Discriminate.” The Yale Law Journal. 
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to their beliefs, and removed the question to be determined at the community level. Their 
policies directly infect affect   children, the subset of the population most likely to be victimized 
and to victimize others because of sexual orientation, to potentially harm their own 
members.117 In response to the Rhode Island Medical Society’s resolution, which stated that 
teen suicide would rise as a result of the Boy Scouts’ ban on gays, the Boy Scouts replied, with 
cold callousness, that there were “other organizations that these kids can be members of.”118 
With that retort, the Boy Scouts diminish the power they assert outside of their membership 
and the efficacy of their expressive message. If they were truly instilling values in their 
members as a norm-creating institution, their denial of partial responsibility implies either that 
they possess an insular community of Scouts completely separated from the rest of society, or 
that the values they propound are only applicable within the confines of their communal 
actions.  
The Court majority opinion endorses “cultural survival” associational law – where the 
culture is a living entity with rights, its culture “static, homogeneous, bounded, and 
distinct;”119 this logical conclusion presupposes their assumption that merely the status of 
being gay is enough to force a message about the organization at large. With their primary 
expressive message, the installation of values in children, and their silence with regard to 
sexuality, the compelled inclusion of Mr. Dale would have little to no actual effect on the 
ability of the Boy Scouts to engage in expressive activity. The allowance for Mr. Dale’s 
exclusion is the Court’s artificial life support of a fading but still majoritarian conception of 
traditional sexual relations, continuing the traditional sexual mores. The “fervently antigay 
attitudes” of three of the Justices presiding over the case, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia120, and 
                                                     
117 “The trouble, of course, is that a seven-year-old boy does not know whether he is gay when he decides to join the Cub 
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Racists?”Pg 376 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, influenced their assessment of a conceivable State justification for such 
a law against discrimination, finding reasonableness and rationality in the Boy Scouts’ 
intention to remove gays as a consequence of their moral inferiority.121 In fact, in previous 
opinions about expressive associations but unrelated to sexual orientation, Scalia’s opinions 
have consistently propounded a distinction between the level of First Amendment protection 
“between actual speech and expressive conduct.”122 Perhaps Justice Stevens recognized that 
personal prejudices may have been at the heart of the Court’s majority opinion when he 
remarked that “The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that 
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their presence alone - unlike 
any other individual's - should be singled out for special First Amendment treatment.”123 The 
Court majority gives the association sovereignty over discursive rights, to the chagrin of its 
membership; they neglect any intra-organizational dissent, instead ascribing a uniform 
ideology on a group’s public façade, successfully continuing the cycle and perpetuation of the 
marginalization of already marginalized groups. Thus, the dissenters within the organization 
unwittingly contribute to the stabilization of caustic stereotypes because of their membership 
in a large, dictatorial association that tenders enough benefit that the option of exit is 
impractical.124 
Carpenter argues that, for the Boy Scouts, silence is their actual expressive speech, 
avoiding a discussion of the morality of sexual conduct, specifically homosexual conduct, by 
insulating it from customary spheres of discussion.125 Resultantly, the “mere presence”126 of 
Mr. Dale does not force an expressive message but, rather, generates a discussion that could 
                                                     
121 Kavey, Michael. “Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to Discriminate.” Pg773 : “Frustrated advocates 
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polarize the group. What minre?85 omits is that Dale itself created that discussion both within 
the organization and around the organization. The Boy Scouts had to address the topic, albeit 
in exceedingly vague terms, in order to proceed with the litigation process, even if the Court 
shielded the Boy Scouts from defending their homophobic views on the national stage; thus, 
the prospective damage caused by Mr. Dale’s presence was self-inflicted by the organization. 
Forced to “come out” as an organization against gay males, their sponsors and communities 
began to critically reexamine relationships with the organization. Unlike GLIB in Hurley, Mr. 
Dale did not join the organization for the express purpose of forwarding a contrarian 
opinion;127 adding to the erosion of the sincerity of the Boy Scouts’ “compelled expression” 
claim. He is not “an essential concomitant of effective speech;”128 if he were, then the 
organization implies either that gay individuals are compulsive (unable to perform tasks 
without flouting their sexual orientation), inferior (inherently unqualified because of their 
sexual orientation), or deviant (if sexual orientation is a choice, they choose to be incompatible 
with the majority of society). Were deterring homosexuality a true mission of the organization, 
and Mr. Dale an exemplar of Scout values before his expulsion, then it would follow that the 
organization failed to express their anti-gay agenda sufficiently enough to instill it in their 
most prototypical members. 
IIIc. The Privatization of Speech Rights  
The main effect of the Boy Scouts in their expulsion of Mr. Dale was to artificially 
tamper with the marketplace of ideas within the organization, quelling dissenting opinions, 
maintaining cultural stasis, and eliminating Mr. Dale’s free speech rights as an entity 
independent of the organization. An individual has the First Amendment right to express 
speech, but the Dale majority protects associational free speech “as private space through 
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property-like entitlements including the rights of absolute use, exclusivity, and transfer,”129 
similar to the “monopoly in the marketplace of ideas” theory expressed earlier in regard to 
Hurley.  
The executive decisions of the Boy Scouts apportion an individual member’s expressive 
rights in the public and private spheres; “individuals have no right to liberty and equality 
within a normative association…or to hold plural views.”130 Dale conferred a chilling effect on 
the Boy Scouts’ membership: the Boy Scouts are sanctioned to remove members expressing 
dissenting or otherwise contrarian views about the organization in the public sphere, and this 
threat of removal enforces the members’ silence. Whether concerning atheists131 or gays, the 
Boy Scouts’ executives dictate the trajectory of debates in both the external and internal 
spheres, asphyxiating the free flow of ideas which the First Amendment promised to protect. 
Recognizing the right of the individual to expressively associate with the organization is 
analogous to recognizing the right of the individual to their own personal identity. The Court 
acknowledges but ultimately rejects the right of the individual to their identity: “that is not to 
say that an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by 
asserting that mere acceptance of a member group would impair its message,”132 but if Mr. 
Dale’s one interview in a local paper compelled expression, likely the discretionary boundaries 
are endless. 
Dale can be reduced to two primary conflicts: that between an organization’s 
leadership and its members, and that between an individual member’s expressive activity in 
public and expression within the association.  If an individual leases an apartment and chooses 
to fly a desecrated American flag outside their window, the property owner cannot unearth 
some unenforced, decades-old document to justify issuing an eviction notice; furthermore, the 
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flag is logically attributed to the individual leaser, not to the apartment building owner. But, 
with Mr. Dale, this situation is exaggerated: an immutable and omnipresent partition of his 
identity cannot be resected at will, so even if he did not fly the flag, the fact that the apartment 
complex owner knew it existed somewhere in the apartment would have been the impetus for 
eviction. The Court’s decision inverts this property arrangement, re-appropriating Mr. Dale’s 
exclusive property, his sexual orientation, as property within the dominion of the 
organization’s rights. Mr. Dale transmitted part of his expression to the Boy Scouts as a 
condition of his membership, trading individual liberty for temporary association; the Boy 
Scouts received this property and provided Mr. Dale with affiliation, so they do not “have the 
right to interfere with Dale's entitlement to affiliation with BSA.”133 The autonomy granted to 
the Boy Scouts by the majority stands against the purpose of expressive associations134; and Mr. 
Dale’s expression, not that of the Boy Scouts, are suppressed.  
Theoretically, the Boy Scouts do not “discourage or forbid outside expressive 
activity,”135 but the Boy Scouts’ treatment of Mr. Dale, alongside the Court’s decision, indicate 
that a certain engagement outside the organization could be threatening enough as to alter 
their expression. This reliance on possibility, not action or regard for past conduct, is an 
infringement on the liberties of the membership. If one can actively advocate for a political 
party outside the Boy Scouts’ confines, it does not follow that advocating for a particular 
political view – gay rights – could be isolated as impermissible. The Boy Scouts instruct their 
Scouts in their set of morals, but punish then for adhering to their values.136 Their ascription of 
intertwinement between their associative expression and Mr. Dale’s sexual orientation in the 
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public sphere bolsters the perception that the Boy Scouts’ influence extends far beyond its 
membership. They imply that Scouting is imbedded in an individual so deeply as to be 
constantly expressed outside the organization; even when Mr. Dale is in the context of a gay 
rights group, he is continually expressing his identity as a member of the Boy Scouts of 
America. Thus, action performed outside the organization by Mr. Dale or other members is 
ascribable to the organization itself. Conversely, if this were the case, then Mr. Dale’s 
expulsion does not terminate his Boy Scout-iness; hence, his expulsion would be a moot point. 
Unless the Boy Scouts committed to a witch hunt – rooting out all the individuals that could be 
construed or potentially to violate the provisions of being “morally straight” or clean” in the 
public sphere – to ensure the maintenance of its expressive speech, a daunting task with such a 
large membership, their complaints about compelled speech are unsubstantiated. 
IV. The Repercussions for Discrimination  
In Hurley and Dale, the Court ascribes proprietary speech rights to expressive 
associations that simultaneously sanction the right to discriminate. Although the view of this 
paper is that neither were exemplary of sound law, the more egregious infringement on the 
rights of gay individuals occurred whence the Court usurped the State’s interest in preventing 
a powerful socializing agent as widespread and prolific as the Boy Scouts of America from 
invidiously discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Moreover, whereas the issue of 
the Parade’s discriminatory composition by the Council has been marginally ameliorated, the 
Boy Scouts of America continue their destructive agenda unperturbed. The “traditional” Parade 
is now succeeded by the “St. Patrick’s Peace Parade,” marching one mile behind and including 
a growing number of participants each year.137 The Council still annually receives the city of 
Boston permit to organize the “traditional” Parade, but after their continued refusal to allow 
                                                     




gay rights groups to march, Boston permitted a group called “Veterans for Peace” to organize 
their own parade to exercise their expressive association rights. 
The Boy Scouts have also been unwavering in their commitment to discrimination. 
Dale, though, thrust the organization out of the homophobia closet by requiring them to 
enunciate their views openly to the public and to a majority of their members. As a result, 
creative organizations and governments have managed to either limit or eliminate funding and 
special privileges previously granted to the Boy Scouts. In response, the Boy Scouts accused 
these governments of impermissible targeting and have initiated litigation against myriad 
municipalities denying them access to facilities or funding.138 
In the court of public opinion, the Boy Scouts are losing favorability. An organization 
once renowned for camping, hiking, skill-building and community service initiatives is now 
blighted with their self-induced stain of prejudice. The Court’s solidification the Boy Scout’s 
executive cadre’s organizational hegemony over the mass of the organization, especially in 
light of their involvement in the wide-scale inculcation of social norms, may have diminished 
their ability to approximate a place of public accommodation. Given the size and distribution 
of the organization, it is dubious that their cultural influence will significantly degrade in the 
near future; but in the long run, as mainstream support for gay equality continues to surge, the 
Boy Scouts will be faced with the Darwinian choice to either descend from relevancy or adapt 
to changing cultural norms. If the marketplace of ideas retains a modicum of efficacy, they will 
                                                     
138 The State of Connecticut excluded the Boy Scouts from a state-sponsored program involving the distribution of 
charitable funds because they claimed that the Boy Scouts’ membership policy violated the State’s anti-
discrimination laws. The Boy Scouts challenged this exclusion with litigation in Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman. 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Till, the Boy Scouts sued the Broward County School Board for barring the Boy Scouts 
from accessing its facilities, again citing its policy against providing services for discriminatory organizations. A 
lease of a State park to the Boy Scouts by the City of San Diego was held to constitute a violation of the Lemon test 
because the Boy Scouts were perceived to utilize their anti-discrimination policy to further religious goals. There 
have been congressional attempts to revoke the Boy Scouts’ charter. Many companies, like Chase Manhattan Bank 
and Levi Strauss, alongside charitable organizations like United Way, have withdrawn funding after Dale. Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida’s city commission denied the annual $10,000 payment to the Boy Scouts as a consequence of 
the Scouts’ violation of the city’s anti-discrimination policy. Anne Arundel County, Maryland eliminated the Boy 
Scouts’ access to their public schools. The Boy Scouts no longer enjoy free use of the City of Chicago’s facilities.  
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elect to adapt, eventually remedying the societal wrong emanating from the majority’s opinion 
in Dale.   
